Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 22
Issue 2 July

Article 8

Summer 1931

Recent Criminal Cases

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Recent Criminal Cases, 22 Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 279 (1931-1932)

This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
Compiled and Edited by the
STUDENT

PUBLICATIONS

NORTHWESTERN

UNIVERSITY

FACULTY
N. F. Baker

A. A.

Abbey, Stuart C.
Akin, Paul C.
Ashcraft, . M. I
Boyle. Jack G.
Bloch, Allan R.
Bloomenthal, Lawrence 'R.
Brady, Jules L.
Carlson, James A.
* Officers.

CRIMINAL
FORCE IN

LAW ROBBERY. -

BOARD
LAW

OF
ScHOOL

ADVISERS
Bruce

STUDENT EDITORS
Fishman, Abraham
*Hale, Hamilton 0. (Chairman)
*Kenoe, Henry W.
Knudsen, Orrin C.
Korfist, Norman A.
Lansden, David V.
Ohrenstein, Edward W.
Pillinger, Douglass

HYPNOSIS

AS

[Alabama]

Prosecutrix, chief witness for the
state, met defendant and soon afterward, according to her testimony,
he hypnotized her, or put her under
a spell.
At defendant's request
prosecutrix obtained her bank books
from her home two miles away,
went to the banks unaccompanied,
and drew out $290. She then returned to where the defendant was
waiting and handed the money to
him. Prosecutrix was not frightened when she drew out her money,
and there was no contention that
violence was committed upon her.
Defendant was convicted of robbery, and appeals on the ground
that the evidence does not sustain
the charge. Held: Judgment reversed. The element of "fear," essential to robbery, is lacking, although defendant may be guilty of
some other crime. Louis v. State
(Court of Appeals of Alabama
1930) 130 So. 904.
The question as to just what acts
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constitute force or fear in robbery
is one involving much judicial construction. Possibility of robbery by
hypnosis presents that question in
its most bizarre form.
There are very few cases involving hypnosis in crime to be found
in the reports: Cf. Sloan "Hypnotism as a Defense to Crime."
(1924) 42 Medico-Legal Journal
37; Note (1897) 40 L. R. A. 269.
In the cases most frequently cited
as authority on the subject of hypnosis,
People v.
Worthington
(1894) 105 Cal. 166, 38 Pac. 689,
and People v. Ebanks (1897) 117
Cal. 665, .49 Pac. 1049, it is obvious
that no genuine question of hypnosis arose. Hypnosis was used as
a desperate defense to a criminal
charge in each case, and so the
above mentioned cases can by no
means be considered a judicial refusal to recognize hypnosis as a
natural phenomenon.
See Sloan,
op. cit., supra, at p. 48.
In the instant case the court
adopted the accepted common law
definition of robbery as "the feloni-
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ous taking of money, or goods of
value, from the person of another,
or in his presence, by violence to
his person, or by putting him in
fear." The court next accepted the
modern definition of hypnosis from
Webster's New International Dictionary as: "a name applied to a
condition, artificially produced, in
which the person hypnotized, apparently asleep, acts in obedience to
the will of the operator." If the
above premises are adhered to, it is
clear that logically hypnosis is not
the equivalent of the essential element of force or fear lii the crime
of robbery.
It is generally held that the use
of some force in the taking of property or the putting of the injured
party in fear is essential to constitute robbery: Monaghan v. State
(1913) 10 Okla, Crim. 89, 134 Pac.
77, 46 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1149; Jones
v. Commonwealth (1902) 112 Ky.
689, 66 S. W. 633, 57 L. R. A. 432;
State v. Parsons (1906) 44 Wash.
299, 87 Pac. 349, 7 L. R. A. (N. s.)
566. However, force and fear often
become little more than mental
domination of the victim by the accused. Thus where defendant put
a gun against a bank messenger's
back and commanded him to drop
the bag he was carrying, a conviction for robbery was sustained:
State v. Redmond (1922) 122 Wash
392, 210 Pac. 772. It may be questioned whether "fear" or merely a
potent type of "suggestion" caused
the bank messenger to drop the bag.
See also Sutton v. State (1924) 162
Ark. 438, 258 S. W. 632. But filching money from a drunken victim's
pocket while helping him home is
not robbery:
People v. Jones
(1919) 290 Ill. 603, 125 N. E. 256;
Hall v. People (1898) 171 Ill. 540,
49 N. E. 495.
Likewise taking
money from a victim by slipping
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a hand in his .pocket while a confederate engages him in conversation has been held not to be robbery: State v. Parker (1914) 262
Mo. 169, 170 S. W. 1121, L. R. A.
1915C 121.
Contra:
Snyder v.
Commonwealth (1900) 21 Ky. Law
Rep. 1538, 55 S. W. 679 (Jostling
by confederate).
In the instant case, through the
application of the doctrine of constructive force there lies a logical
pathway for the interpretation of
hypnosis as force, sufficient to bring
the case within the category of robbery, had the court so desired. Thus
in a case in which the defendant
drugged the bartender of a saloon,
and while the latter was unconscious, took money from the cash
register, the court affirmed a conviction for robbery on the ground
that such taking involved constructive force, reasoning entirely by
analogy from rape cases in which
the female was drugged, or was
otherwise made unable to resist:
State v. Snyder (1919) 41 Nev. 453,
172 Pac. 364, L. R. A. 1918E 933.
In a prosecution for seduction in
which there was hypnosis of the
female by the defendant, the court
sustained a conviction on the
ground that hypnosis of the victim
was a destruction of the woman's
power of resistance: State v. Donovan (1905) 128 Iowa 45, 102 N.
W. 791. If hypnosis is considered
as destroying a woman's power of
resistance, and overcoming the
power of resistance in such manner is constructive force, it would
follow that hypnosis of a robbery
victim is a form of constructive
force. However, in the instant case,
the court approached the question
directly, and did not deem hypnosis
a force element sufficient to constitute the crime of robbery.
E. W. OHRENSTEIN.
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AN ACCOMPLICE.-[Illinois] Under
an indictment for burglary, the evidence against defendants consisted
entirely of the testimony of one
Kleiner who had been promised by
the State that his release on probation would be recommended. The
trial court instructed the jury that
"under the laws of the State of Illinois a defendant may be convicted
upon the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice; and if the jury
believe from the evidence in this
case, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the testimony given by the witness Kleiner is true, then they can
act upon the same as true. The
testimony of an accomplice, like all
other evidence in the case, is for the
jury to pass upon. The jury is
further instructed that the witness
Kleiner is an accomplice in this
case." Held: on appeal, that the
judgment be reversed on the ground
that whether Kleiner was or was
not an accomplice of the defendant
was a question of fact for the jury;
and that the jury should have been
instructed that the testimony of an
accomplice is subject to grave suspicion and should be considered in
the light of all other evidence in
the case and the influence under
which the testimony is given.
People v. Smith (Ill. 1931) 174 N.
E. 828.
Where there is any conflict in the
testimony as to whether a witness
is or is not an accomplice, the issue
must be submitted to the jury:
Elizando v. State (1892) 31 Tex.
Cr. 237, 20 S. W. 560; Common,wealth v. Bisch (1896) 165 Mass.
188, 42 N. E. 560; Hargrove v.
State (1906) 125 Ga. 270, 54 S. E.
164; People v. Swersky (1916) 216
N. Y. 471, 111 N. E. 212. But
where the facts are all admitted and
no issue thereon is raised by the

evidence, it then becomes a question of law for the court: Territory v. West (1908) 14 N. M. 546,
99 P. 343; People v. Sternberg
(1896) 111 Cal. 11, 43 P. 201;
Cudjoe v. State (1916 Okl.) 154 P.
500. Where there was no conflict
as to the evidence it was held reversible error for the Court to submit such question to the juryState v. Carr (1895) 28 Or. 389,
42 P. 215. There is nothing in the
record of the principal case indicating that there was a conflict of evidence as to whether Kleiner was an
accomplice, but it was held that the
Court by deciding the case "expressed an opinion" on the most important question in the case: People v. Smith, supra at 830.
At common law one could be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice: King v.
Attwood (1788) 1 Leach 464. But
it was competent for the court to
caution the jury and point out the
danger of such uncorroborated
testimony: Gray v. People (1861)
26 Ill. 344; see Rex v. Jones (1809)
2 Camp. 131, 132. Such advice to
the jury was merely a "counsel of
caution" not a rule of evidence: 4
Wiginore "Evidence" (2d ed. 1923)
sec. 2056; State v. Potter (1869)
42 Vt. 495; see Cross v. People
(1868) 47 Ill. 152, 160; Collins v.
People (1881)
98 IIl. 584, 589;
State v. Stebbins (1860) 29 Conn.
462, 473. It was a matter of discretion with the trial judge and
failure to caution the jury on such
matter was not ground for a new
trial: Porath, v. State (1895) 90
Wis. 535, 63 N. W. 1061; see Commonwealth v. Price (1858 Mass.)
10 Gray 472, 71 Am. Dec. 668;
Cheatham v. State (1889) 67 Miss.
335, 343, 7 So. 204; State v. Hier
(1905) 78 Vt. 488, 492, 63 A. 877.
Some states have by statute turned
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the caution into a rule of law: 4
Wigmore "Evidence," supra; Ala.
Code 1923, sec. 5635; Calif. *P. C.
(1872) 1111, C. C. P., sec. 2061,
par. 4; Minn. Gen. St. 1923 C92,
sec. 9903. Illinois has no statute
but refusal of the Court, in giving
such an instruction, to include a
caution is reversible error: Hoyt
v. People (1892) 149 Ill. 588, 30 N.
E. 315. An instruction exactly the
same as that in the principal case
was held not to be erroneous because another instruction gave sufficient caution: People v. Frankenburg (1908) 236 II. 408, 86 N. E.
128. It is error to instruct the jury
that the credibility of an accomplice
is to be passed upon "as any other
witness" although following this
they are warned that the testimony
of an accomplice must be received
with great caution: People v. Rongetti (1930) 338 Ill. 56, 170 N. E.
14. Contra: 'People v. Rees (1915)
268 Ill. 585, 109 N. E. 473. Where
the credibility of an accomplice was
attacked it was held that the court
was under a duty to take the case
away from the jury: United States
v. Murphy (1918 N. D. of N. Y.)
253 Fed. 404. It has been held that
the jury should consider the elements of benefits or malice affecting the credibility of an accomplice:
People v. Harvey (1926) -321 Ill.
361, 367, 152 N. E. 147, 149; People v. Elmore (1925) 318 Ill. 276,
290, 149 N. E. 286, 291.
Although conviction may be sustained upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice such
testimony is open to the gravest
suspicion and the Court upon review will look at all the evidence
and set aside the verdict if- satisfled that there is a reasonable doubt
of the defendant's guilt: People v.
Gammuto (1918) 280 III. 225, 117
N. E. 454; People v. Aiello (1922)
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302 Ill. 518, 135 N. E. 62; People v.
Pattin (1919) 290 Ill. 542, 125 N.
E. 248; Cochran v. People (1918)
175 Ill. 28, 51 N. E. 845.
ESTHER NEWTON.

GAMING-SLOT MACHINE AS A
GAMBLING DEVICE-AMUSEMENT AS

A THING OF VALUE.-[Iowa]

This
was an action to condemn as a
gambling device, a slot-vending machine which, upon the deposit of a
nickel, uniformly released one package of mints. In addition to the
mints there were released, at times
and in quantities determined only
by chance, brass discs or tokens,
stamped on one side, "no cash
value," and on the other side, "good
for amusement only". These tokens
remained the property of the vendor and could be used only to replay
the machine for the customer's sole
amusement. Nothing of value waz
ever vended with the token, its
only function and use being, upon
deposit in the slot, to spin a set
of reels on which were printed certain phrases, and which, when they
stopped spinning, formed sentences
purporting to give humorous advice
to the player. Held, that this machine was a gambling device subject to condemnation under the
statute: Iowa Code 1927, ch. 593,
secs. 3198-13215 (prohibiting any
"game
of
chance",
"gambling
scheme or device", or "gift enterprise" without definition of these
terms) : State ex rel. Manchester
V. Marvin (Iowa 1930) 233 N. W.
486.
The court, holding that the fortune telling feature made the vending machine a gambling device,
said, "The use of the discs had a
manifest purpose.
Such purpose
was to stimulate the expectation
of the buying patron that he
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might' receive something more
than a package of mints.
..
Among the patrons of the machine,
some, if not many of them, might
prefer the feature of amusement
rather than the package of mints.
If these discs were made 'good'
for admission to a movie or other
place of amusement, their character
as a gambling device would be easily recognized.
Something akin
thereto was their actual function as.
used." This comment will be concerned chiefly with the question
whether a vending machine, by reason of having attached to it an
amusement feature such as described
above, thereby becomes a gambling
device.
Since gambling was no crime at
common law: Bishop, "Statutory
Crimes" (3rd ed. 1901), sec. 846,
the terms "gambling" and "gambling
devices" have no settled and definite
meaning and often statutes fail to
define them: State v. Mann (1867)
2 Ore. 238. "To gamble is to play
or engage in a game for money or
other stake, and gambling, in its
broadest and most generic sense,
comprehends every species of game
or device of chance": Brill, "Cyclopedia Criminal Law" (1922) sec.
1075. "A gambling device is any
contrivance by the operation of
which chances are determined
whereby money or property is lost
or Avon": Brill, supra, sec. 1091.
A slot machine is a gambling device where the return to the player
is dependent upon an element of
chance: Case Note (1908) 20 L.
R. A. (N. s.) 239. Even though
the player in any event receives something, and even though
that something is worth the money
spent, so that the player cannot lose,
yet the machine is a gambling device if the player stands a chance
to win "something" in addition:

Case Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 73.
On most slot machines the customer stakes money, and the keeper
or operator stakes money, candy,
cigars, other merchandise, or trade
checks. In the instant case, the
stake was amusement-the operation of the fortune telling device.
The customer was certain to receive
his money's worth of mints. But
the principal case held that the
chance of winning this amusement
made the mint-vending machine a
gambling device.
Generally, the value of the thing
at stake is immaterial; the statutes
do not discriminate between large
and small wagers. It was held to
be gambling to play for "money or
other thing of value" in McBride
v. State (1897) 39 Fla. 442, 22 So.
711; "money or other thing" in
Allen v. Commonwealth (1917) 178
Ky. 250; 198 S. W. 896. The term
"property" is said to include "everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, taigible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything
that has an exchangeable value
.": Wapsie Power Co. v. City
of Tipton (1923) 197 Ia. 996, 193
N. W. 643, 645.
The right of the player to operate a machine so as to cause it to
display a card containing a funny
saying or a prophecy is clearly a
"thing" which apparently has an
"exchangeable value". Therefore,
a machine of chance upon which it
may be won is technically a
"gambling device": Green v. Hart
(1930) 41 Fed. (2d) 855 (on the
ground that the combination of the
element of chance with the inducement of receiving "something" for
nothing results in gambling and that
such a saying or prophecy is "something") ; Rankin v. Mills Novelty
Co. (Ark. 1930) 32 S. W. (2d) 161
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(a device with which the customer
could play a symbolic game of base
ball was held to be a thing of value
as contributing to the amusement of
the public).
The only possible ground for
reaching a contrary result would be
to regard the amusement vended as
having so small a value that the law
will not consider it-that is, "de
minimis non curat lex". That position was apparently taken in Overby
v. Oklahoma (Okla. 1930) 287 Pac.
796, where it was held that a slot
machine similar to the one condemned in the instant case was not
a gambling device, the tokens being
regarded as having no value. In
Ross v. Goodwin (1930) 40 F. (2d)
535, such a machine was condemned
because of the peculiar statute, but
the court intimated that the amusement feature was not a thing of
value.
In spite of this judicial opinion to
the contrary, the principal case is
supported by the reasoning behina
the statutes. The machine is an incitement to 'the gambling impulse,
and in persons of little or immature
intelligence the operation may have
that effect. The argument that no
serious injury to the morals of the
community will result from such a
machine is an argument for a legislature, not for a court. In theory
such a device is no less an evil than
a roulette wheel. The difference is
one of degree, not of principle.
ABRAHAM FISHMAN.

CRIMINAL
AUTOMOBILE
PROBABLE

LAW WITHOUT

CAUSE-

OF
SEARCH
WARRANT-

DISCLOSURE

INFORANT.-[Federal]

OF

On an in-

dictment for a violation of the National Prohibition Act, the defendant, before trial, filed a motion to
suppress the use of certain liquor

as evidence on the ground that such
evidence had been acquired by an
illegal search and seizure. Two
Federal prohibition agents, acting
on information that the defendant
would transport liquor in his automobile along a certain highway at
a certain time, intercepted the defendant and, on his denial of transportation, searched his car and
found a quantity of liquor, which
was later sought to be introduced in
evidence. The officers did not have
a warrant and acted solely on the
information received, taken together with the fact, known to one
officer, that the defendant had
previously been convicted of violating a liquor ordinance in a near-by
city.
On trial, the officers were asked
the name of their informant but refused to disclose it, following the
policy of the Department forbidding
such disclosures. Held: that the
evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause for a search
without a warrant; that the motion
to suppress the evidence be sustained and order entered accordingly, reserving to the plaintiff the
proper exceptions. In its opinion,
the court pointed out that the testimony of the informant is not always necessary to establish probable cause, but that when officers
search an automobile without a warrant, they may be required to disclose every element on which they
relied to establish probable cause,
and such a rule may reasonably include the source of any information
United States v. Blich
received:
(D. C., D. Wyo., 1930) 45 F. (2d)
627.
The question in this case, whether
a prohibition agent who searches an
automobile for liquor, without a
warrant, but on information which
he believes to be credible, may be
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required to disclose the name of
his informant, is but a refinement of
the broader questions as to the general right to search an automobile
or other vehicle for transporting
liquor, without a warrant, but on
probable cause, and as to the elements going to establish probable
cause.
The proposition that an
automobile suspected of being used
in the transportation of intoxicating liquor may be searched by officers without a warrant, but on
probable cause, is so well settled today that it is necessary to cite only
the leading case: Carroll v. United
States (1925) 267 U. S. 132, 45
Sup. Ct. 280. In this and in other
cases, it has been pointed out that
the search of an automobile or
other vehicle is an exception to the
general rule on search and seizure
for the obvious reason that the mobile character of such a vehicle
makes an immediate search imperative, before the object of search
may be moved out of the jurisdiction:
Carroll v. United States,
supra; Moore v. State (1925) 138
Miss. 116, 103 So. 483; Peru v.
United States (C. C. A., 8th, 1925)
4 F. (2d) 881. However, even
where there is sufficient time to
procure a warrant, a failure to do
so does not invalidate the search:
Woodson v. State (1929) 111 Tex.
Cr. App. 348, 13 S. W. (2d) 102.
Various definitions have been
given as to what constitutes probable cause for such a search; it has
been held that probable cause is not
restricted to information or knowledge gained by the officer in the
exercise of his senses, but that
cause may be based, in whole or in
part, on information furnished to
the officer from external sources;
thus officers acted on probable cause
when "the facts and circumstances
within their knowledge and of
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which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient
in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that
intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which they
stopped and searched": Carroll v.
United States, supia. Belief based
on the information furnished by a
credible person has been held sufficient to constitute probable cause:
Moore v. State, supra. Where the
facts and circumstances lead the
officer to a reasonable belief that the
law is being violated, a search of
an automobile, without a warrant,
is justified: Ash v. United States
(C. C. A., 4th, 1924) 299 F. 277.
Some courts adopt a more exacting
test and require that such information be received "from sources apparently so reliable that a prudent
and careful person, having due regard for the rights of others, would
act thereon": People v. Kainhout
(1924) 227 Mich. 172, 198 N. W.
831. Still more stringent is the
statutory requirement that where an
officer searches without a warrant,
he must have absolute personal
knowledge that the law is being
violated: State v. Simmons (1926)
192 N. C. 692, 135 S. E. 866 (P. L.
1923, c. 1, sec. 6). The determination of the presence or absence of
probable cause has been held to be
a judicial question: Story v. City
of Greenwood (1929) 158 Miss.
755, 121 So. 481; Hamilton v.State
(1928) 149 Miss. 251, 115 So. 427;
Moore v. State, supra. Probable
cause must exist before the search
is begun, and no information acquired in the course of search is
admissible to establish the existence
of such cause: Sellers v. Lofton
(1929) 149 Miss. 849, 116 So. 104;
Ford v. City of Jackson (1929) 153
Miss. 616, 121 So. 278. The burden of proof that the search in
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question is unreasonable arrd unlawful has been held to be on him
who contends for the contrary:
United 'States v. Vatune (D. C.,
1923) 292 F. 497. In some States,
a presumption exists by statute that
the officer performed his official
duty in a regular manner: State v.
District Court of Fourth Judicial
District (1925) 72 Mont., 213, 232
Pac. 201 (Rev. Codes 1921, Par.
10606).
Obviously, the most satisfactory
ground for probable cause is the information gained by the officer
of his
the exercise
through
senses,, and the courts have so held.
Thus where the officer sees or
smells the liquor, or sees the defendant acting in a suspicious manner, many courts have declared that
such knowledge is sufficient to establislh probable cause for a search
without a warrant: Smith v. State
(Tex. Cr. App., 1930) 31 S. W.
(2d) 826 (officer saw liquor in automobile); State v. Knudsen (Wash.
1929) 280 Pac. 922 (same); People
v. Krahm (1925) 230 Mich. 528,
203 N. W. 105 (same). But cf.
Hoyer v. State (1923) 180 Wis. 407,
193 N. W. 89 (holding invalid a
search made after a collision, where
officer had no suspicion of a violation until he saw the liquor in the
car). Actions of the driver of an
automobile which may lead to the
belief that the law is being violated
have been held to constitute probable cause: People v. Chyc (1922)
219 Mich. 273, 189 N. W. 70 (officers saw the defendant intoxicated
beside his car); United States v.
Rembert (D. C., S. D. Tex., 1922)
284 F. 996 (officer saw driver of
automobile was intoxicated); Borders v. State (Tex. Cr. App., 1930)
27 S. W. (2d) 172 (sight of containers, coupled with the sight of
the defendant breaking bottles);
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Murray v. State (Tex. Cr. App.,

1930) 29 S. W. (2d) 354 (same).
But cf. Sellers v. Lofton, supra
(holding that loud talking and
laughing and driving automobile in
a zigzag course, considered apart
from other information or lnowledge, does not constitute probable
cause). See also Emite v. United
States (C. C. A., 5th, 1926) 15 F.
{2d) 623 (holding that the sight
of an automobile heavily loaded
and carefully driven over a bad
road does not constitute probable
Where the officer smells
cause).
liquor, either alone or in connection with other knowledge or information, some courts have held
that this was good probable cause:
Hinds v. State (Ind. 1930) 170 N.
E. 539 (officer smelled liquor, in addition to possessing other information); Gree v. State (Ind. 1929)
168 N. E. 581 (same); Beauchamp
v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1930) 32
S. W. (2d) 476 (the smell of liquor,
unsupported by other evidence);
State ex rel. Hanson v. District
Court (1925) 72 Mont. 245, 233 Pac.
126 (holding that smell and sight
alone were sufficient).
As said above, the bases of probable cause are not limited to sensory
knowledge, but may include information furnished to the officer
from external sources. Here the
question of establishing probable
cause is rendered more difficult due
to the infinite gradations in the type
of information received, its reliability and sources, and similar considerations, and consequently, the decisions are not in accord. It appears to be well settled, however,
that mere suspiciou alone will not
constitute probable cause: King v.
State (1928) 151 Miss. 482, 118 So.
413; Karlen v. State (Ind. 1930)
174 N. E. 89. See also Hamilton
v. State, supra. The question is
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often complicated by the fact that
the officer acted partly on sensory
knowledge and partly on information from an external source: Faut
v. State (Ind. 1929) 168 N. E. 124
(holding that information,, when
supported by circumstances within
the knowledge of the officer, is good
cause): State v. Kelly (1928) 38
Wyo., 455, 268 Pac. 571 (same);
Burnett v. State (Ind. 1929) 166
N. E. 430 (same). A very common
situation appears to be where the
officer is informed, by another officer or some other person, that a
described car will be found at a
certain place and time in the act of
transporting liquor: State ex rel.
Brown v. District Court of Fourth
Judicial District in and for Ravalli
County (1925) 72 Mont. 213, 232
Pac. 201 (information from another
officer) Hanger v. State (1928) 199
Ind. 727, 160 N. E. 449 (same);
Burnett v. State, supra (information from private individual) ;
Jenkins v. State (Tex. Cr. App.
1930) 32 S. W. (2d) 848 (same).
In many cases, the source of the
information does not appear, the
receipt of the information alone being stated: People v. Deya (1930)
250 Mich. 692, 230 N. W. 918;
Malmin v. State (1926) 30 Ariz.
258, 246 Pac. 548, .Houck v. State
(1922) 106 Ohio St. 195, 140 N. E.
112; Johnson v. State (1928) 111
Tex. Cr. App. 417, 13 S. W. (2d)
114. It has been held that such information must be furnished by a
reliable or credible person: Kirk
V. State (1929) 111 Tex. Cr. App.
388, 13 S. W. (2d) 106; State ex
rel. Brown v. District Court, supra.
Where then the information is from
an anonymous source, as an anonymous telephone call, some courtn
have stated that this is not sufficient to establish probable cause:
State v. Knudsen, supra; Faut v.

State, supra. But where circumstances within the officer's own
knowledge and observation support
such anonymous information, probable cause may be established:
Faut v. State, supra
The cases seem to indicate that
where an officer has searched an
automobile without a warrant, but
on probable cause, the source of external information is frequently not
disclosed and more frequently is not
put in issue. Consequently, in this
class of cases, there appear to be
few decisions which treat directly
of the disclosure of the source of
information as a necessary element
to establish probable cause. The
rule in Mississippi may be cited as
an example of the requirement that
the officer must disclose the source
of his information, including the
name of his informant, on demand
of the person accused: Hamilton
v. State, supra; McNutt v. State
(1926) 143 Miss. 347, 108 So. 721;
Ford v. City of Jackson, supra;
Story v. City of Greenwood, supra.
A similar rule seems to be followed
in the Federal courts, where it has
been held that the court should
have the opportunity to examine the
information of the officer for the
purpose of ascertaining its reliability and the fact whether such officer
was justified in believing it: United
States v. Allen (D. C., S. D. Fla.
1926) 16 F. (2d) 320; Enite v.
United States, supra.
The instant case illustrates the
very common situation where the
officers are informed by some person that at a certain time and place
they may find liquor being transported in a described automobile or
by a described person. Here the
defendant demanded to know the
source of the information relied
upon to institute the search without
warrant, but the officers refused to
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disclose it. In holding that the officers must disclose every element
going to estahbi'i- probable cause,
and that such disclosure might reasonably inqlude the name of the informant, the District Court was in
accord with the prevailing rule in
some States and in the higher FedEmite v. United
eral courts:
States, supra; United States v.
Allen, supra.
STUART C. ABBEY.

SUNDAY STATUTES-MOTION PICTURE SHOWS ON SUNDAY.-[Texas]

Two decisions from Texas again
present the problem of operating
motion picture show entertainments
on Sunday. In one case a sign in
front of defendant's theater read:
"Regular Admission-10c & 30cToday Your Free Will Offering."
Defendant was found guilty of vio-.
lating the Sunday law, set out in the
Texas Penal Code, articles 286, 287,
in keeping open a place of public
amusemenl for traffic on Sunday.
Held, on appeal, that the conviction
- should be affirmed because the "free
will offering" was a mere subterfuge to circumvent charging an adThe opinion also
mission fee.
stated that the Code sections are not
unconstitutional in excepting certain businesses from the operation
of the Sunday law. Sayeg v. State
(Tex. Crim. App. 1930) 25 S. W.
(2d) 865. By the second decision
the defendant was fined for keeping
a picture show open on the Sabbath.
Held, on appeal, that the information charging the offense was sufficient. Hodge v. State (Tex. Crim.
App. 1930. 32 S. W. (2d) 191.
There appear to be no decisions
convicting persons for attending
performances on the Lord's Day as
patrons. Conviction of owners or
employees operating motion picture

shows on Sunday have been justified under several types of Sunday
law statutes, but generally the accused persons have been held criminally responsible for violating general statutes prohibiting disturbing
"the peace and good order of society by labor, works of necessity
and charity" (or mercy) -'excepted."
Illinois Rev. Stat. (Cahill 1929)
ch. 38, sec. 573, 574; (SmithHurd Annot'd 1930) ch. 38, sec.
On what constitutes
549, 550.
"necessity" or "charity" see (1926,
1927) 12 St. Louis Law Rev. 77-80,
123-138; (1923) 9 Va. Law Rev.
473-5 (violation is a question of
fact for jury); (1922) 94 Central
Law J. 12. Cases of convictions
under this type of statute include:
Rosenbaum V. State (1917) 131 Ark.
251, 199 S. W. 388, State v. Ryan
(1908) 80 Conn. 582, 69 Atl. 536;
Gillooley v. Vaughn (1926) 92 Fla.
943, 110 So. 653 (combined with
municipal ordinance); State v.
Kelly (1930) 129 Kan. 849, 284 Pac.
363; State v. Blair (1930) 130 Kan.
863, 288 Pac. 729; Capitol Theater
Co. v. Commonwealth (1918) 178
Ky. 780, 199 S. W. 1076 ("profit
for amusement"); State v. Smith
and cases seq. (1921) 19 Okla. Cr.
184, 198 Pac. 879 ("servile labor");
State v. Kennedy (Mo. App. 1925)
277 S.W. 943. The Illinois statute,
supra, appears not to have been invoked directly in a prosecution by
the State as applying to Sabbath
operation of a cinema show. Confusion in New York on the same
type of statute is shown by Frohlich
arid Schwartz "The Law of Motion
Pictures and the Theater" (1918)
sec. 120. A conviction was obtained
as late as People ex rel. Bender v.
Joyce (1916) 161 N. Y. S. 771, 174
App. Div. 574, but now Sunday
photoplay performers are permitted
by statute: see Wertheimer v.
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Schwab (1925) 210 N. Y. S. 312,
315, 124 Misc. 822. The exception
of theaters and places of amusement from Sunday laws is also seen
in City of Bogalusa v. Blanchard
(1917) 141 La. 33, 74 So. 588.
Another type of statute is that
which forbids Sabbath motion picture performances for pay; Sunday
operation was within the prohibition of such statute in Consolidated
EnterprisesInc. v. State (1924) 150
Tenn. 148, 263 S. W. 74; State ex
rel. Temple v. Barnes (1911) 22
N. D. 18, 132 N. W. 215. Cf: State
v. Goethal (1921) 44 S. D. 222,
182 N. W. 943 (statute held to prohibit only certain kinds of picture
films on Sunday). A statute forbidding "theatrical performances"
was found applicable in Richards
v. State (1924) 110 Ohio St. 311,
143 N. E. 714, (1924) 11 Va. Law.
Rev. 60-2. Contra: State v. Penny
(1910) 42 Mont. 118, 111 Pac. 727
(strict construction of "theater").
Further cases Qf convictions are as
follows: Crawford v. City of Pascagoula (1920) 123 Miss. 131, 85
So. 181; State v. Rosenburg (N. J.
1915) 115 Atl. 203, (1922) 2 Boston
Univ. Law Rev. 214 ("disorderly
house") see Hogan v. Firth (N. J.
1921) 115 Atl. 204 ("worldly business"); State v. Reade (1923) 98
N. J. L. 596, 121 Atl. 288 ("playhouse for gain").
The principal cases are only two
of a numerous series from Texas
arising under the Texas Penal Code,
which forbids a place of public
amusement to be open for traffic
on Sunday: Spooner v. State (Tex.
1916) 182 S. W. 1121; Zuccaro v.
State (1917) 82 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 197
S. W. 982, L. R. A. 1918B 354,
361n; Heginan v. State (1921) 88
Tex. Cr. R. 548, 227 S. W. 954;

Brockman v. State (Tex. 1930) 28
S. W. (2d) 820, 29 S. W. (2d)
790; Fulgham v. State (Tex. 1930)
29 S. W. (2d) 791.
In addition to State v. Penny,
supra, cases which indicate that
Sunday picture shows are not in
contravention of the local Sunday
laws are: State v. Morris (1916)
28 Ida. 599, 155 Pac. 296 (religious
lecture illustrated by pictures-conviction under statute against Sunday operation of "any theater" reversed) ; S t a t e v. Chamberlain
(1910) 112 Minn. 52, 127 N. W. 444
(Sunday photoplay show is not
within the Lord's Day statute
against . "public sports, exercises,
and shows").
In conclusion, it would be well
to mention that a defendant's criminal responsibility for operating a
cinema performance on the Sabbath usually arises by way of indictment or information, but cases
have appeared where an injunction
against a Sunday show was sought
on the grounds of nuisance. Injunctive relief was granted in Albany Theater v. Short (Ga. 1930)
154 S. E. 895. Contra: State v.
Barry (Tex, 1919) 212 S. W. 304.
217 S. W. 957 (a dignified performance was neither a nuisance
nor injury to property rights although the acts charged constituted
a violation of the Penal Code; same
sections as involved in the principal
cases). However, courts are not in
the habit of granting an injunction
to enforce' the criminal law: Twig163
gar v. Rosenburg (1916)
N.. Y. S. 771; Lyric Theater Co. v.
State (1911) 98 Ark. 437, 136 S. W.
174; Carrell v. State ex rel. Little
(1911) 33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 325n.
D. V. LANSDEN.

